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Non-technical summary
Financial systems vary greatly even among nations at similar stages of economic development. For instance, bank lending is the leading source of funds for most German firms, while financial markets play a larger role in the U.S.
In this paper, we describe a dynamic, general equilibrium model in which two economies can continue to have very different financial systems long after their fundamental characteristics have converged. In simple terms, this occurs in our theory because channelling funds through the financial market is cheaper in economies that have borne the cost of building large financial markets in the past. Specifically, in our model, entry into the financial market bears a fixed cost, but no further cost until lenders choose to exit and revert to using bank finance.
One key result we establish is that given a sequence of fundamental characteristics (that is, for each period, the cost of bank intermediation, the cost of entry on the financial market, and the distribution of project characteristics) and given an initial size of the financial market, a unique equilibrium sequence of financial market sizes exists. Put another way, fundamentals fully explain financial systems.
Yet we also establish that convergence in fundamentals does not imply financial convergence. Economies with different initial financial systems may continue to differ even if their fundamental characteristics become forever identical. The intuition for this result is simple. Current fundamentals may not justify entry into the financial market for lenders who have yet to pay the fixed cost, but it may be profitable for incumbent lenders to stay put. The financial market can remain persistently large in an economy where past fundamentals led a high number of lenders to enter the financial market. It follows that to understand an economy's current financial structure, one need to take account of past fundamentals. In other words, history matters.
Quite importantly, financial structures are efficient given the history of fundamental characteristics of each economy. While current fundamentals may not suffice to explain a nation's current financial structure, together with past fundamentals they fully explain, and justify it. Therefore the main policy implication of the model is that it is crucial to understand the emergence of financial structures before reforming them. Financial structures may appear inefficient when compared with current fundamentals; still they can be entirely justified by past and current fundamentals. Also our model highlights financial market entry barriers as one reason why financial systems differ, and removing them would speed up financial convergence. Specifically, we embed the adverse selection model of Bolton and Freixas (2000) in a dynamic, general equilibrium framework. Every period, a continuum of borrowers need to fund a two-stage, risky project. The likelihood of a positive payoff at the end of the first stage is public information, but only the borrower knows the likelihood of a positive payoff at the end of the second stage of his project. Other agents simply know that projects more likely to succeed in the first stage are also more likely to succeed in the second stage. Lenders can make their funds available to borrowers directly on a financial market, or, instead, via a bank. Bank intermediation is costly, but the bank learns the quality of the project at the end of the first stage. In the financial market, lenders discover the quality of the project after funding its second stage. Entry into the financial market carries an initial fixed cost, but no further cost until lenders choose to exit and revert to using the bank.
In competitive equilibrium, agents take the gross surplus lenders can expect on the financial market as given, and the market for each type of financing clears every period. As in Bolton and Freixas (2000) , borrowers whose project is too risky receive no funding, while safe projects are funded on the financial market. Projects of intermediate risk level obtain funding from the bank. One key result we establish is that given a sequence of fundamental characteristics (that is, for each period, the cost of bank intermediation, the cost of entry on the financial market, and the distribution of project characteristics) and given an initial size of the financial market, a unique equilibrium sequence of financial market sizes exists.
Put another way, fundamentals fully explain financial systems. Yet we also establish that
Introduction
Financial systems vary greatly even among nations at similar stages of economic development.
For instance, bank lending is the leading source of funds for most German firms, while financial markets play a larger role in the U.S.
1 In this paper, we describe a model in which two By rationalizing differences in financial structures even in observably similar economies, our theory differs from those of Dewratipont and Maskin (1995), Holmstrom (1996) , or Bolton and Freixas (2000), among others. In effect, we show that embedding those theories in a standard framework of firm dynamics can help us understand the persistence of financial structures. Furthermore, we obtain persistence without resorting to multiple equilibria. Baliga and Pollak (2004) , for instance, find that their static model of monitored versus non-monitored financing can support both German and Anglo-saxon equilibria that are robust to individual deviations. In our model, the equilibrium is unique and Pareto efficient. As in Allen and Gale (2000) , financial outcomes cannot be Pareto ranked. More generally, ours is a step towards thinking about financial systems in the context of a dynamic, general equilibrium environment in which the impact of policy choices can be studied. 
Historical Motivation
One motivation for this paper is the fact that, historically, institutional environments have differed markedly in Germany and the United States. In the U.S., banking activities have been regulated by states since the end of the Second Bank of the U.S. in 1836. The fear of concentration in the banking sector prompted most states to impose restrictions on branching.
The National Banking System introduced after the Civil War in 1863 further limited the scale and scope of banks by restricting their holdings of equities and imposing minimum capital requirement (see Sylla, 1969 .) The importance of local banks, the absence of nationwide banks rediscounting, and most important, by the evolution of a national market for commercial paper." Unlike the banking sector, financial markets were subject to little regulation in the U.S. (see Smith and Werner, 1991 Tilly (1982) reports that "only larger firms having a stock exchange listing could tap in that market for capital without delay and only large firms would not find the minimum issue volume of one million marks and minimum share size of one thousand marks inconvenient. This gap must have benefited banks who did have access to the stock exchange, but it also must have excluded many potential users of the capital market." As far as investors are concerned, the 1885 stock exchange laws restricted access to the Berlin Stock Exchange. Entrance tickets ("Eintrittskarte") were only granted to members of the "Korporation der Kaufmannschaft von Berlin" and owners of firms or corporations that were registered in Berlin. 5 Importantly, it is barriers to access to the stock market, rather than its malfunctioning, that seem to have limited its development. Gehrig and Fohlin (2004) argue that the Berlin Stock Exchange was surprisingly efficient for the time. 5 We thank to Martin Uebele and Stefan Volk for providing this information to us. Unfortunately, we could not obtain the price of these tickets.
to some degree at least, like a lender of last resort. Banks that were in trouble could sell bills out of their own portfolio to the Bank of Prussia" (Tilly, 1998 . institutional convergence, financial systems could continue differing for a long time. That the U.S. developed large financial markets early is not surprising given its institutional history.
According to our model, this head-start could explain why the U.S. continues to emphasize financial markets today. Similarly, the fact that large banks were set up initially in Germany could explain why they are still a prominent form of finance today.
The environment
Time is discrete and infinite. The economy we study is populated by three classes of riskneutral agents: borrowers, lenders, and a bank. Lenders have mass > 1. They are infinitely lived, discount future flows at rate β ∈ (0, 1), and are endowed with two units of the consumption good at the beginning of each period. A mass one of borrowers are born every period.
They live for one period and are not endowed with any consumption good. They are however endowed with a productive technology described by parameters
and R > 0. This technology transforms one unit of the consumption good invested at the beginning of the period into R units after half a period with probability p 1 . With probability 1 − p 1 , this first investment yields nothing. Borrowers can then invest another unit of the consumption good with proceeds R with probability p 2 , 0 with probability 1 − p 2 . Borrowers also enjoy non-monetary benefits B for each half-period in which their project is implemented.
While R is common across borrowers, p 1 and p 2 vary. Borrowers know the characteristics of their own technology, but other agents only know p 1 . We will refer to borrowers with p 2 = 1 as good borrowers, while other borrowers will be termed bad borrowers. The distribution of borrower characteristics at the beginning of the period is known by all agents. Agents also by the bank. Germany does not mandate any firewalls.
securities underwriting have been gradually relaxed. 6 Our model suggests that despite this that in an environment with full information bad projects would not be implemented.
On the other hand, some good projects are profitable in the sense that for p 1 large enough, expected returns exceed the opportunity cost of the funds a project requires:
Like lenders, the bank is infinitely lived. It can store deposits on behalf of lenders during the period with a net return normalized to zero. 8 It can also lend funds to borrowers. In that case, the bank incurs a cost ρ t ≥ 0 for each unit of good it lends to borrowers at date t, and discovers whether each project is good or bad at the end of the first stage of production.
Instead of depositing their endowment at the bank, lenders can make it available directly to a borrower. If at date t − 1 a lender chose the bank option, choosing the direct lending option at date t entails cost c t > 0. Lenders who already chose to lend their endowment directly at date t − 1 can do so once again at date t at no cost. We will refer to lenders who lend their funds directly to borrowers and the borrowers who obtain funds directly from lenders as the financial market. By size of the financial market we will mean the mass of projects so funded. Unlike banks, lenders on the financial market only find out whether a project is good or bad after funding its second stage.
Contracts
Consider a borrower who seeks funding from the bank given a current cost ρ ≥ 0 of intermediation. A contract between the borrower and the bank stipulates a transfer x 1 ≤ R from the 8 Alternatively, we could assume that the bank has access to a foreign capital market where a one period risk-free security pays zero interest. more likely to be good projects. Like Bolton and Freixas (2000), we restrict parameters so g(p 1 ) of borrowers with initial likelihood of success p 1 are good borrowers.
7 Safe projects are 7 Notice that we do not make any assumption of independence of outcome across projects. We simply assume no aggregate uncertainty. all borrowers of a given publicly observable type p 1 receive the same terms from the bank.
We will assume that the bank behaves competitively so that among the contracts that cover the bank's expected costs, the most favorable borrowers prevails. That is, the bank offers borrowers of type p 1 a contract x 1 , x 2 that solves:
subject to the bank's participation constraint:
Indeed, good borrowers are successful with probability p 1 in the first half-period, in which case their net income is R − x 1 , and are successful with probability 1 in the second half-period and earn R − x 2 . They also enjoy non-monetary benefits 2B since the project is implemented in both subperiods. The bank's expected return and cost depend on whether the borrower is good or bad. They earn x 1 during the first stage with probability p 1 , and x 2 during the second stage if the borrower proves good, which occurs in fraction g(p 1 ) of the projects. The bank's cost per unit loaned is the sum of the monitoring cost ρ and the gross return (1) on risk-free investments. The bank's cost, therefore, is 1 + ρ for the first half-period, and 1 + ρ again for the second half period when the borrower turns out to be good. Note that the bank can cover its expected cost if and only if
Denote by p B (ρ) the value of p 1 for which this condition holds as an equality. The optimal contract is easy to characterize:
Proposition 4.1. Optimal bank contracts for borrowers with projects of type p 1 ≥ p B (ρ), are
. The bank offers no contract to projects of type p 1 < p B (ρ).
Proof. First write the objective function as (
Then note that at a solution, the bank's participation constraint is binding since the objective at the end of the period if the borrower turns out to be good. Because they enjoy private benefit B when and only when their project is financed, bad borrowers want their projects to be implemented in both half-periods. Since bad projects are never profitable (assumption Since 1−g(p 1 ) > 0, making x 2 as low as possible is optimal. This implies that (R,
) is optimal. Indeed, assumption 3.1 says that setting x 1 = R does not suffice to cover the bank's costs. Together with the fact that p 1 ≥ p B (ρ), it implies that
prove the second part of the proposition, simply note that the participation constraint is violated even if
Turning now to the financial market, assume that contracts on the financial market currently give at least gross surplus q M to lenders. We assume that borrowers and lenders behave competitively in the financial market in the sense that they take this surplus as given. We will refer to q M as the price of financial market contract. Then the optimal contract for good borrowers with success probability p 1 solves:
subject to the lenders' participation constraint:
As in the case of banking contracts, optimal contracts on the financial market for projects of type
, while no contracts are offered to other types of borrowers.
Notice that since competition prevails on both financial sectors, the surplus borrowers enjoy in each type of contract is a monotonic function of the right hand side of the participation constraint. Borrowers of a given type simply choose the financial option associated with the weakest participation constraint. As a corollary, all the equilibrium results we establish below continue to hold as long as borrowers have preferences representable by a strictly increasing utility function. Assuming that they are risk-averse, for instance, would not change any of our conclusions. The dynamic results we establish in the remainder of this paper are also independent of the theory of financial intermediation one has in mind. We rely on the framework of Bolton and Freixas (2000) because it is a simple static model in which banks and min
(1 − g(p 1 ))x 2 subject to
function is strictly decreasing in x 1 and x 2 . So we may rewrite the problem as Our goal is to study financial market development in an economy with a given sequence
of financial market entry costs, intermediation costs and distributions of observable project characteristics.
9 Like Lucas and Prescott (1971), we will study equilibria in which all agents know and take as given the sequence {q
of prices of financial market contracts. We will require that when agents behave optimally given those prices, the market for each type of financing clears every period.
Recall that at a given date t > 0, a lender's opportunities to invest his endowment depend on their investment decision at date t − 1. If at date t − 1 they supplied their endowment on the financial market, they can choose to do the same at no cost at date t. We will denote by V M t the expected present value of future income as of date t for lenders who were in the financial market at date t − 1. Other lenders must bear cost c t if they choose to enter the financial market. Let V B t be the expected present value of future income as of date t for those lenders.
In each period, lenders decide whether to deposit their endowment in the bank, or lend it on the financial market. They choose the option that maximizes their future income.
Formally, for all t ≥ 0,
Indeed, lending on the financial market yields q M t in the current period and expected income V M t+1 as of date t + 1. Bank deposits on the other hand yield zero net return (since the bank behaves competitively) and give the lender expected income V B t+1 as of period t + 1. Similar considerations for lenders who were not in the financial market at date t − 1 yield:
9 By F t we mean the distribution of borrowers' observable success types. We assume for notational simplicity that R and g are constant across projects and across time. t > 0, with equality if e t > 0. But this implies
for all t or, for short and for all t,
As for exit, x t > 0 in equilibrium for some t will imply q
, or more succinctly, q
In passing, note as a result of these observations, x t > 0 implies e t = 0. Entry into and exit from the financial market cannot coincide in equilibrium.
10
We now turn to the problem solved by borrowers in equilibrium. We need to calculate the mass of borrowers who obtain funding on the financial market in each period. Recall first that borrowers whose project is too risky, specifically borrowers whose p 1 is such that
) at a given date t ≥ 0, cannot get any funding on the financial market. Borrowers whose p 1 exceed this threshold expect utility p 1 R + R + 2B − (1 + ρ t + g(p 1 )(1 + ρ t )) from the bank, while on the financial market they expect p 1 R + R + 2B − q M t . Therefore, a borrower's expected utility is higher on the financial market if q M t ≤ 1 + ρ t + g(p 1 )(1 + ρ t ). It follows that borrowers on the financial market at date t have mass 1 − F t (p * 1 (q M t , ρ t )) where
for all q, ρ ≥ 0, with the convention that g −1 is zero if
is negative. It is, in other words, borrowers with relatively safe projects that opt for the financial market. This is because bank monitoring is particularly valuable for good borrowers with a low p 1 . Our model inherits this feature from the model of Bolton and Freixas (2000) . Note for future reference that p * 1 is continuous, rises with its first argument, and decreases with its second argument.
We can now define an equilibrium from the vantage point of a reference date t = 0. All relevant past information is summarized by the mass m −1 of lenders who were on the financial market at date t − 1, that is, the size of the financial market at date t − 1. Given m −1 , a 10 This feature is no longer present when we introduce exogenous exit in section 7.
Denote by e t the mass of lenders who enter the financial market at date t while x t is the fraction of lenders who exit the financial market. Because there are more lenders than borrowers ( > 1) in each period, it is necessary in equilibrium that q 1.
The key result of this section is that the fundamental characteristics {c t , ρ t , F t } +∞ t=0 of the economy uniquely determine its financial development. Proof. From a technical standpoint, our economy resembles the framework of Hopenhayn,
1992,
11 and like Hopenhayn, we will adapt the arguments of Lucas and Prescott, 1971 to establish that a unique equilibrium exists in our model. For m ∈ (0, 1), define D t (m) implicitly
is therefore the market price for which m lenders are active in the market. To see that D t is well-defined for all t, recall that F t is continuous and strictly increasing, and note that for q large enough p * 1 (q, ρ t ) = 1, while for q small enough p * 
for all t, where µ t ≥ 0 is the value of the multiplier associated with the second constraint at date t. But then (5.3) implies v 1 (m t , t) = λ t . So v 1 (m t , t) ≥ 0. If λ t happens to be positive, x t = 0, hence µ t = 0 by (5.6). Then λ t = S 1 (m + e − x, t) − 2 + βv 1 (m + e − x, t + 1), by
. It follows that, To see that an equilibrium exists, observe that the surplus maximization problem is the maximization of a continuous function on a compact subset of IR ∞ equipped with the product topology. As for uniqueness, note that the set of feasible sequences {x t , e t } +∞ t=0 is convex, and that S(•, t) is strictly concave for all t because D t is strictly decreasing. This completes the proof. 
and q M t = S 1 (m t + e t − x t , t), We will show that, convergence in fundamentals does not imply convergence in financial structures unless entry into the financial market is free. To emphasize the key role of entry costs, we first show that if, eventually, c 13 To obtain a generic convergence result assuming that {F systems, their fundamental characteristics must have differed at some point. This, however, does not imply that two economies whose fundamental characteristics converge will converge to similar financial systems. We now turn to establishing this result. converge to the same financial structure is that Γ be a singleton. Otherwise, two economies whose initial conditions are two distinct points of the invariant set would remain at those distinct points at all dates. The following remark records the fact that Γ is a singleton when entry into the financial market is costless.
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Under that assumption, we obtain: all t. Then q > 2 and for all q ∈ (2, q ), q t = q for all t implies V M t − c < V B for all t so that e t = 0 for all t. But since q > 2 we also have x t = 0 for all t. It follows that for q ∈ [2, q ],
Because F is strictly increasing and continuous, the set of such size of the financial market is a closed interval of positive mass.
The intuition for this result is simple. Fundamentals imply a unique sequence of prices of financial contracts. Those prices can be such that it is profitable for lenders who have borne the entry cost to remain on the financial market, but not high enough to cover the entry cost for lenders who have yet to bear it. If c is high, many such price sequences exist and so, therefore, do many invariant sizes of the financial market. The fact that the upper bound of the set of invariant distribution is the unique element (m * = 1 − F (p preferences, though still monotonic, to borrowers would not affect our results. Two critical assumptions we make however are that 1) no exogenous exit from financial markets ever occurs and, 2) that lenders cannot fund more than one project with bounded size. The purpose of this section is to discuss the role of those two key assumptions.
Exogenous exit
So far we have assumed that there is no exit from the financial market for exogenous reasons.
Lenders exit when and only when it is profit maximizing for them to do so. Lenders who entered the financial market in the past because fundamental characteristics justified it may choose to stay put in equilibrium while given current and future fundamentals lenders who have yet to pay the fixed cost maximize their income by staying out of the financial market.
To highlight the importance of this feature of our model, we now introduce exogenous exit by assuming that a fraction δ > 0 of lenders die every period and and are immediately replaced by newly born lenders. Furthermore, all newly born lenders have to pay the fixed cost if they choose to enter the financial market. For clarity, we state here the equations which the value functions of lenders must solve when death occurs with positive likelihood.
From the point of view of risk-neutral lenders, this only means that they discount future flows at rate βδ, instead of β:
while, for lenders who were not in the financial market at date t − 1,
Our definition of an equilibrium changes little. The main difference is that condition 3 becomes, for all t ≥ 0, m t+1 = m t (1−δ)−x t +e t , where x t is understood as the mass of surviving lenders who choose to exit the financial market in period t. Obtaining convergence, therefore, requires that exit occurs exogenously sufficiently enough, and that the lenders who replace lenders on the financial market do not inherit their opportunities. Note however that convergence occurs at a rate that depends on the rate of exogenous exit. While not permanent, differences in financial market can be arbitrarily persistent if the rate of exogenous exit is low.
Project size
In our model, participation in the financial market allows lenders to manage exactly one project for any number of periods after bearing a cost of entry. However, they cannot fund more than one project. Relaxing this assumption enables lenders to mitigate entry costs. For instance, lenders could pool resources and delegate a representative in the financial market, dividing the proceeds equally among members of the coalition.
14 If the entry cost borne by the coalition does not increase with its size, the entry cost per project can be made arbitrarily small. As a consequence, the set of invariant financial market sizes will shrink. One key assumption we are making, therefore, is that the total cost of setting up projects increases with the number of projects, even if the same lender is involved in all projects.
A related assumption we are making is that project size is unique. Under the alternative assumption that lenders can fund project of various sizes, and that set-up costs increase less than linearly with size, large projects would be funded first on the financial market. But, again, as long as funding more projects carries an initial cost, channelling more resources to the financial market will be more costly. Then, as in our basic model, economies who have 14 Lender could also choose to accumulate resources in order to fund several projects. Wealth accumulation introduces additional technical complications since the evolution of the economy now depends on another state variable. But as long as setting up more projects is costly for lenders, financial systems should be persistent. 
Conclusion
We have presented a dynamic, general equilibrium model in which financial structure differences between two economies can persist even after fundamental characteristics have converged. In simple terms, this occurs in our theory because channelling funds through the financial market is cheaper in economies that have borne the cost of building large financial markets in the past.
A possible illustration of these forces at play are the economic histories of Germany and the United States. Germany used to impose significant legal barriers to entry into financial markets. Meanwhile, federal laws discouraged bank intermediation in the U.S. As a consequence, early on, banks became heavily involved in corporate lending in Germany, while U.S. firms learned to rely on other sources of funds. Even though the legal frameworks of the two nations no longer differ much, the U.S. has a longer history of financial market lending than Germany, and financial markets remain a more cost effective source of funds for U.S. firms than for German firms.
Quite importantly, equilibria are unique and Pareto optimal in our model. Financial structures are efficient given the fundamental characteristics of each economy. While current fundamentals may not suffice to explain a nation's current financial structure, together with past fundamentals they fully explain, and justify it. Therefore the main policy implication of the model is that it is crucial to understand the emergence of financial structures before reforming them. Financial structures may appear inefficient when compared with current fundamentals, still they can be entirely justified by past and current fundamentals. Also our model highlights financial market entry barriers as one reason why financial systems differ, and removing them would speed up financial convergence. Finally, our model more generally suggests that basic industrial organization principles could help us understand why financial structures vary so markedly across nations.
created a large financial market in the past will remain more likely to have a large financial market in the future, making financial structure persistent. In short, as long as making the financial market bigger from one period to the next is costly, history will continue to matter. 
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